Hello. This is Attorney Lee Young-kyung from Cheongchul Law Firm.
Today, I would like to introduce a very important Supreme Court ruling regarding the criminal liability of cash collectors in voice phishing crimes.
I. Overview of the Case
Background and Progression of the Case
The defendant in this case became a cash collector at the suggestion of a voice phishing organization member he met through an online job portal and committed the following crimes:
Date | Amount of Damage | Method of Crime |
2022.1.12 | 6 million KRW | Loan fraud |
2022.1.14 | 18.19 million KRW | Loan fraud |
2022.1.17 | 9 million KRW | Loan fraud |
2022.1.19 | 30 million KRW | Loan fraud |
2022.1.19 | 6.3 million KRW | Account fraud |
2022.1.20 | 17 million KRW, 5.7 million KRW | Account fraud |
The defendant collected a total of 92.19 million KRW over 7 occasions in 11 days, and during this process, he forged and used official documents in the name of the Financial Supervisory Service and private documents in the name of financial institutions, as well as committed additional crimes such as using someone else's resident registration number for bank transfers.
Issues
The key issue in this case is whether the defendant "knew or at least negligently recognized that he was participating in a voice phishing crime".
II. Supreme Court's Judgment
Legal Principles of Conspiracy and Joint Criminal Activity
The Supreme Court presented important legal principles regarding the establishment of conspiracy in voice phishing crimes as follows:
"It is sufficient for the cash collector in voice phishing to recognize the fact that he is collecting cash from victims with the intent to commit a crime in collaboration with other accomplices, either sequentially or tacitly. Such recognition may be negligent, and it does not require a specific understanding of the entire methodology or content of the voice phishing crime."
Standard for Determining Intent
The Supreme Court ruled that the defendant's intent should be recognized based on the following circumstantial evidence:
First, the defendant's recruitment process was very unusual. The Supreme Court pointed out that "the defendant posted his resume on a job site early in the morning on January 6, 2022, and was contacted by a voice phishing organization member the same morning without going through any separate interview procedures, nor was there any process to verify or guarantee the defendant's identity or credit, and there was no employment contract even prepared."
The cash collection method was also clearly abnormal. The Supreme Court mentioned that "the defendant received a KakaoTalk message from 'Co-defendant 11' instructing him to move to a specific location and only received descriptions of the victims and the documents to be handed over shortly before arriving at that location." Furthermore, it emphasized that "he merely told the victims that he came at the request of someone he did not even know, called 'Co-defendant 12 Deputy Manager' or 'Co-defendant 10 Team Leader', and collected cash from them on the spot."
Regarding document forgery (inadequacy of presented documents), the Supreme Court made a clear judgment. "The content of the documents printed by the defendant mainly stated that 'they would prove the transparency of financial accounts through an investigation into the victim's financial assets' or 'the loans have been fully repaid'. These were irrelevant to the real estate brokerage firm's real estate market research tasks, and the content and format were crude," it indicated. Moreover, it pointed out that "it is generally difficult to imagine a financial institution proving loan repayment status before the payment is made and allowing such documents containing personal information to be printed anywhere," concluding that the defendant could easily have recognized the forgery of the documents.
On the issue of how cash was collected and transferred, the Supreme Court raised serious doubts. "The defendant collected cash from victims and split it into amounts of about 1 million KRW through bank ATMs, remitting it to third parties unrelated to the real estate brokerage firm using the names and resident registration numbers of several people that he did not know at all according to instructions from 'Co-defendant 11'." It clearly stated that this method constitutes "the use of another person's personal information in transactions and, in consideration of societal common transaction notions or experiences, is not a normal collection method."
Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that "despite having strong suspicions about the illegality of his cash collection work prior to meeting the victim in this case on January 12, 2022, the defendant indiscriminately engaged in cash collection under another's name and repeatedly handled cash using someone else's name and resident registration number over a short period while receiving a considerable sum in return."
III. Practical Implications
This ruling has presented very important standards regarding the criminal liability of cash collectors in voice phishing crimes.
First, a negligent intent regarding the crime can be proven through circumstantial evidence. An abnormal recruitment process, unusual job content, and abnormal transaction methods become crucial judgment criteria.
Second, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that "it does not require specific recognition of the entire methodology or content of the voice phishing crime," making it difficult to accept the excuse that cash collectors were unaware of the details of the entire crime. Detailed verification of specific facts and legal claims will be necessary in cases related to such incidents.
Cheongchul Law Firm has rich experience and expertise in criminal cases. If you are considering a case related to this, please feel free to contact us.



