Recently, the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) announced the results of its review of the collusion case involving three sugar companies. Given that the prosecution has already arrested and indicted key individuals involved, the size of the fines was a critical issue, and a total of 408.3 billion won was imposed on the three companies, making it the second-largest fine in the history of collusion cases. As a result, these companies will each have to pay fines of over 100 billion won.

However, looking into the details, the level of fines imposed by the FTC in the current sugar collusion case can be seen as the highest among all collusion cases to date. The total related sales amount to 3.2884 trillion won, which is quite large compared to the number of colluding businesses, and the unusually high imposition rate of 15% compared to other collusion cases is noteworthy. Article 43 of the 'Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act' (Fair Trade Act) sets the cap for fines in collusion cases at '20% of related sales', and considering various mitigating factors set forth in the 'Notification on Detailed Standards for Fine Imposition', the 15% rate corresponds to the maximum level permitted by the system.

Despite a previous case where sugar companies faced sanctions for similar allegations in 2007, they colluded again, avoiding the FTC's scrutiny. Given that sugar is a major raw food ingredient that directly impacts the livelihoods of ordinary citizens, the fact that the prosecution released its investigative findings before the FTC, and that the President mentioned the fine levels during a Cabinet meeting, which drew significant attention from the government and media, it appears that this time the FTC did not hold back and decisively cracked down on the colluding companies.

Even when examining the top five past collusion cases by fine amounts, the imposition rate for this sugar collusion case stands out. Some criticize the FTC for dragging its feet with slack investigations only to apply an unusually high imposition rate while watching the President’s reaction, but I believe this opinion is not valid. Before the comprehensive revision of the Fair Trade Act in 2021, the cap for fines in collusion cases was 10%, and even among the top five cases, the FTC had already applied an imposition rate equivalent to 70% of that cap (7%).

[Comparison with the top 5 collusion cases by fine amounts]

Moreover, due to the 'conspiratorial nature of collusion', the FTC, which only has administrative investigation authority of a discretionary nature, can secure evidence at a more limited level than expected. Even when they identify specific practical offenders and conduct testimony investigations, it is common for individuals to simply deny any wrongdoing. If they rush to make punitive decisions based solely on circumstantial evidence without enough direct evidence due to time pressure, the likelihood of having those decisions overturned in subsequent administrative lawsuits increases. Ultimately, from the FTC's perspective, they have no choice but to focus on sufficiently securing the evidence necessary for proof, even if it takes time. Therefore, simply criticizing the duration of investigations overlooks the need to improve the collusion regulation system and unfairly places all blame on a single institution.

At this point, it is important to note that cooperation between institutions overseeing collusion cases needs to be designed more closely. Following this case, it is expected that the fines imposed by the FTC on collusion will generally increase, but (as harsher penalties do not eliminate offenses) if that happens, collusion may become even more covert and sophisticated in the future. In that case, unless the FTC is granted compulsory investigative authority, the role of investigating agencies in securing evidence will inevitably become more prominent.

Furthermore, under the current government's design to separate prosecution and investigation and establish a new Serious Crimes Investigation Agency, the prosecutors who previously handled fair trade investigations will likely be restructured to focus on the initiation and maintenance of prosecutions. Therefore, there needs to be serious discussions on which agency will handle investigations into fair trade cases, how to resolve discrepancies in leniency rankings resulting from regulatory agency separation, and how to reform the FTC's exclusive complaint authority.

In the case of this sugar collusion, it is known that the rankings of leniency applicants for the FTC and the prosecution differ, and given that a search and seizure by the prosecution occurred in September 2025 after the FTC's field investigation in March 2024, one wonders if the collusion could have been identified more quickly had there been closer cooperation between the two agencies. However, this is less about the responsibilities of the two agencies and more about the government's and legislators' task to design the system efficiently.

According to FTC data, as of 2024, about 40% (237 cases) of fair trade law violation cases are collusion cases, indicating that collusion still occurs throughout our society. Rather than sensational interest in the amount of fines, it seems necessary to take this case as an opportunity to establish a new framework for collusion regulation and to promote systematic relations between the FTC and investigating agencies. It is hoped that public and media interest in the sugar collusion case will serve as a catalyst for discussions on institutional improvements.

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